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Abstract
We provide a simple and efficient algorithm for adversarial k-action d-outcome non-degenerate
locally observable partial monitoring games for which the n-round minimax regret is bounded by
6(d+ 1)k3/2
√
n log(k), matching the best known information-theoretic upper bound. The same
algorithm also achieves near-optimal regret for full information, bandit and globally observable
games.
1 Introduction
Partial monitoring is a generalisation of the bandit framework that decouples the loss and the obser-
vations. The framework is sufficiently rich to model bandits, linear bandits, full information games,
dynamic pricing, bandits with graph feedback and many problems between and beyond these exam-
ples. For positive integer m let [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. A finite adversarial partial monitoring game is
determined by a signal matrix Φ ∈ Σk×d and loss matrix L ∈ [0, 1]k×d where Σ is an arbitrary finite
set. Both Φ and L are known to the learner. The game proceeds over n rounds. First the adver-
sary chooses a sequence (xt)nt=1 with xt ∈ [d]. In each round t ∈ [n] the learner chooses an action
At ∈ [k], suffers loss LAtxt , but only observes the signal σt = ΦAtxt . The regret is
Rn(pi, (xt)
n
t=1) = max
a∈[k]
E
[
n∑
t=1
LAtxt − Laxt
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness in the actions and pi is the policy of the learner
mapping action/observation sequences to distributions over the actions. When they are clear from the
context, we omit pi and (xt)nt=1 from the expression for the regret. The minimax regret is
R∗n = infpi sup(xt)nt=1
Rn(pi, (xt)
n
t=1) ,
which only depends on n, Φ and L and is our main interest. Our main contribution is a simple and
efficient algorithm for finite non-degenerate locally observable partial monitoring games for which
R∗n ≤ 6k3/2(d+ 1)
√
n log(k) . (1)
The same algorithm is adaptive to other types of game, achieving near-optimal regret for globally
observable games, a regret of
√
2nk log(k) for bandits and
√
2n log(k) for full information games.
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Trivial R∗n = 0
Easy R∗n = Θ(n1/2)
Hard R∗n = Θ(n2/3)
Hopeless R∗n = Ω(n)
Table 1: Classification of finite partial moni-
toring
Related work Partial monitoring goes back to the work
by Rustichini [1999], who derived Hannan consistent
policies. There has been significant effort in understand-
ing the dependence of the regret on the horizon. The key
result is the classification theorem, showing that all fi-
nite partial monitoring games lie in one of four categories
as illustrated in Table 1. The classification theorem also
gives a procedure to decide into which category a given
game belongs. Since the game is known in advance, there is no need to learn the classification of
the game. This result has been pieced together over about a decade by a number of authors [Cesa-
Bianchi et al., 2006; Foster and Rakhlin, 2012; Antos et al., 2013; Barto´k et al., 2014; Lattimore and
Szepesva´ri, 2019a]. Ironically, the ‘easy’ games present the greatest challenge for algorithm design
and analysis.
The best known bound for an efficient algorithm for ‘easy’ games is Rn ≤ C(Φ,L)
√
n log(n),
where the constant C(Φ,L) can be arbitrarily large, even for fixed k and d [Foster and Rakhlin, 2012;
Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019a]. Furthermore, the algorithms achieving this bound are complicated
to analyse and the proofs yield little insight into the structure of partial monitoring. Recently we
proved that for the ‘non-degenerate’ (defined later) subset of easy games, the minimax regret is at
most R∗n ≤ (d+ 1)k3/2
√
8n log(k) [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019b]. Unfortunately, however, our
proof non-constructively appealed to minimax duality and the Bayesian regret analysis techniques by
Russo and Van Roy [2016]. No algorithm was provided, a deficiency we now resolve.
Partial monitoring has been studied in a variety of contexts. For example, bandits with graph
feedback [Alon et al., 2015] and a linear feedback setting [Lin et al., 2014]. Some authors also consider
a variant of the regret that refines the notion of optimality in hopeless games [Rustichini, 1999; Mannor
and Shimkin, 2003; Perchet, 2011; Mannor et al., 2014]. Our focus is on the adversarial setting, but the
stochastic setup is also interesting and is better understood [Barto´k et al., 2011; Vanchinathan et al.,
2014; Komiyama et al., 2015].
Approach Our algorithms are based on exponential weights with unbiased importance-weighted
loss difference estimators [Freund and Schapire, 1997]. Crucially, the algorithms do not sample from
the distribution proposed by exponential weights. Instead, they solve a convex optimisation prob-
lem to find an unbiased loss difference estimator and new distribution over actions for which the loss
cannot be much larger than the proposal distribution and the ‘stability’ term in the bound of expo-
nential weights is minimised. We then prove that the value of the optimisation problem appears in
the resulting regret guarantee and provide upper bounds for different classes of games. The most
challenging aspect is to prove the existence of a suitable exploration distribution for locally observ-
able non-degenerate games, which follows by combining a minimax theorem with insights from the
Bayesian setting. The idea to modify the distribution proposed by exponential weights is reminiscent
of the work by McMahan and Streeter [2009] for bandits with expert advice, though the situation here
is rather different.
2 Notation and concepts
We write 0 and 1 for the column vectors of all zeros and all ones respectively. For a positive semidef-
inite matrix A and vector x, we let ‖x‖2A = x>Ax and diag(x) be the diagonal matrix with x on the
2
diagonal. We use ‖A‖∞ = maxij |Aij | for the (entrywise) maximum norm of A, which we also use
for the special case that A is a vector. The minimum entry of a matrix is min(A) = minij Aij . The
standard basis vectors are e1, . . . , ed; we use the same symbols regardless of the dimension, which
should be clear from the context in all cases.
Root
a
In-trees An in-tree with vertex set [k] is a set T ⊆ [k]× [k] representing
the edges of a directed tree with vertices [k]. Furthermore, we assume
there is a root vertex denoted by rootT ∈ [k] such that for all a ∈ [k]
there is a directed path pathT (a) ⊆ T from a to the root. The path
from the root is the empty set: pathT (rootT ) = ∅. The figure depicts an
in-tree over k = 10 vertices. The blue (barred) path is pathT (a).
Partial monitoring Throughout we fix a partial monitoring game G =
(Φ,L) with loss matrix L ∈ [0, 1]k×d and signal matrix Φ ∈ Σk×d. Let
D = {ν ∈ [0, 1]d : ‖ν‖1 = 1} and P = {p ∈ [0, 1]k : ‖p‖1 = 1} be the probability simplices of
dimension d−1 and k−1 respectively. It is helpful to notice that if p ∈ P and ν ∈ D, then p>Lν is the
expected loss suffered by a learner sampling an action from p while the adversary samples its output
from ν. Given an action a ∈ [k] let Ca = {ν ∈ D : e>a Lν ≤ minb∈[k] e>b Lν} be the set of probability
vectors inD where action a is optimal to play in expectation if the adversary plays randomly according
to ν. We call Ca the cell of action a. Cells are convex polytopes because they are bounded and are
determined by finitely many non-strict linear constraints. The collection {Ca : a ∈ [k]}, illustrated in
Fig. 1, is called the cell decomposition.
Figure 1: Cell decompositions and neighbourhood graphs for two games with d = 3 and k = 5.
Remark 1. A generalisation of the framework allows (xt)nt=1 to be chosen in an arbitrary outcome
space X and L : [k] × X → [0, 1] and Φ : [k] × X → Σ are arbitrary functions. Our mathe-
matical results continue to hold in this case with d = |X |, but the proposed algorithms may not be
computationally efficient when |X | =∞. A short discussion of infinite games appears in Section 7.
Neighbourhood graph A key concept in partial monitoring is the neighbourhood relation, which
gives those pairs of potentially optimal actions that can be simultaneously optimal. An action a is
called Pareto optimal if dim(Ca) = d − 1 where the dimension of a polytope is defined as the di-
mension of its affine hull as an affine subspace. Pareto optimal actions a and b are neighbours if
dim(Ca ∩ Cb) = d − 2. More informally, actions are neighbours if their cells share a boundary of
dimension d− 2. Note that dim(Ca ∩ Cb) = d− 1 is only possible when the rows in the loss matrix
associated with actions a and b are the same: e>a L = e>b L. The neighbourhood relation defines a
3
graph over [k]. We let E = {(a, b) : a and b are neighbours} be the set of edges in this graph. A game
is called non-degenerate if all actions are Pareto optimal and e>a L 6= e>b L for any actions a 6= b. Of
course, dim(D) = d − 1, so actions a with dim(Ca) < d − 1 are optimal on a ‘negligible’ subset
of D, where they cannot be uniquely optimal. For the remainder we make the following simplifying
assumption.
Assumption 2. G is globally observable and non-degenerate.
There is no particular reason to discard degenerate games except their analysis requires careful
handling of certain edge cases, as we discuss briefly in the discussion and extensively in other work
[Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019a].
Observability The classification of a partial monitoring game depends on both the loss and signal
matrices. What is important to make a non-degenerate game ‘easy’ is that the learner should have
some way to estimate the loss differences between neighbouring actions by playing only those actions,
a property known as local observability. To begin we introduce a linear structure on the signal matrix.
For action a, let Sa ∈ {0, 1}|Σ|×d be the matrix with (Sa)σx = 1(Φax = σ), which means that
Saex = eΦax . Here we have abused notation by indexing the rows of Sa using signals, which we also
do for vectors in R|Σ|. An important point is that SAtext = eσt , which can be computed by the learner
at the end of round t. A game is globally observable if for all edges e = (a, b) in the neighbourhood
graph there exists a tuple of ‘estimation’ vectors (wec)kc=1 with wec ∈ R|Σ| so that
Lax − Lbx =
k∑
c=1
w>ecScex =
k∑
c=1
(wec)Φcx for all x ∈ [d] . (2)
A non-degenerate game is locally observable if Eq. (2) holds and additionally wec can be chosen so
that wec = 0 for all c /∈ {a, b}. Of course, all locally observable games are globally observable.
Remark 3. The reader should be aware that for arbitrary (possibly degenerate) games the definition
of local observability is that there exist estimation vectors such that Eq. (2) holds and wec = 0 unless
e>c L = αe>a L + (1 − α)e>b L for some α ∈ [0, 1]. For non-degenerate games the definitions are
equivalent by [Barto´k et al., 2014, Lemma 11].
The classification theorem we mentioned in the introduction says that
R∗n =

0 , if there is only one Pareto optimal action ;
Θ(n1/2) , if the game is locally observable ;
Θ(n2/3) , if the game is globally observable ;
Ω(n) , otherwise ,
where the Big-Oh notation hides game-dependent constants.
Estimation The following lemma and discussion afterwards shows that for globally observable
games Eq. (2) can be chained along paths in the neighbourhood graph to estimate the loss differences
between any pair of actions, not just neighbours.
Lemma 4. If G is non-degenerate and globally observable, then there exists a collection of matrices
(Ga)
k
a=1 with Ga ∈ Rk×|Σ| and c ∈ Rd such that
∑k
a=1GaSa = L − [c11, . . . , cd1].
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Proof. Let T ⊆ E be any in-tree over [k] and (Ga)bσ =
∑
e∈pathT (b)(wea)σ. Then
e>b
k∑
a=1
GaSaex =
k∑
a=1
(Ga)bΦax =
k∑
a=1
∑
e∈pathT (b)
(wea)Φax = Lbx − LrootT x .
The result follows by setting cx = LrootT x.
Given a distribution p ∈ P∩ (0, 1)k and (Ga)ka=1 satisfying the conclusion of Lemma 4, it follows
that if A is sampled from p and x ∈ [d] is arbitrary, then for actions a, b,
E
[
(ea − eb)>GASAex
pA
]
=
k∑
c=1
(ea − eb)>GceΦcx = Lax − Lbx . (3)
The point is that SAtext = eσt is observed by the learner, which means the matrices (Ga)
k
a=1 can be
used with importance-weighting to estimate the loss differences.
Bandit and full information games Bandit and full information games with finitely many possible
losses can be modelled by finite partial monitoring games, and serve as useful examples. Bandit games
are those with L = Φ and full information games have Φax = (L1x, . . . ,Lkx). Estimation matrices
witnessing the conclusion of Lemma 4 are easily constructed. The obvious choice for bandit games is
(Ga)bσ = 1(a = b)σ while for full information games (Ga)bσ = paσb where p ∈ P is any probability
distribution over the actions.
Exponential weights We briefly summarise a well-known bound on the regret of exponential weights.
For q ∈ P define Ψq : Rk → R by
Ψq(z) =
〈
q, exp(−z) + z − 1〉 , (4)
where the exponential function is applied coordinate-wise. Suppose that (yˆt)nt=1 is an arbitrary se-
quence of (loss) vectors with yˆt ∈ Rk and (ηt)nt=1 is a non-increasing sequence of positive learning
rates. Define a sequence of probability vectors (qt)nt=1 by
qta =
exp
(
−ηt
∑t−1
s=1 yˆsa
)
∑k
b=1 exp
(
−ηt
∑t−1
s=1 yˆsb
) .
Then the following bound on the regret holds for any a∗ ∈ [k] [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019,
Chapter 28, for example],
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
qta(yˆta − yˆta∗) ≤ log(k)
ηn
+
n∑
t=1
Ψqt(ηtyˆt)
ηt
. (5)
Note, there is no randomness here. The term involving Ψ is sometimes called the stability term. The
following inequality is useful:
Ψq(ηy) ≤
{
η2 ‖y‖2diag(q) , if ηy ≥ −1 ;
1
2η
2 ‖y‖2diag(q) , if ηy ≥ 0 ,
(6)
which follows from the inequalities exp(−x) ≤ x2−x+1 for all x ≥ −1 and exp(−x) ≤ x2/2−x+1
for x ≥ 0. We will use the fact that the perspective (p, z) 7→ pΨq(z/p) is convex for p > 0.
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3 Exploration by optimisation
Our algorithm is a combination of exponential weights and a careful exploration strategy. The follow-
ing example game is helpful to gain some intuition:
L =
 0 11 0
1/4 1/4
 and Φ =
⊥ ⊥⊥ ⊥
H T
 . 1 23 (7)
The figure on the right is the neighbourhood graph, with the first two actions separated by the third.
The structure of the feedback matrix means that the learner only gains information by playing the third
action. Suppose that q ∈ P is a distribution with q3 close to zero and both q1 and q2 reasonably large.
Sampling an action from q leads to a low probability of gaining information and a correspondingly
high variance when estimating the difference between the losses of the first and second actions. Con-
sider the transformation of q defined by p = q − min(q1, q2)(e1 + e2) + 2 min(q1, q2)e3, which is
illustrated in Fig. 2. Then p3 ≥ q3 and
(p− q)>L = −1
2
min(q1, q2)1 . (8)
Hence, any algorithm proposing to play distribution q ∈ P with min(q1, q2) > 0 could improve its
decision by playing p, which decreases the expected loss and increases the amount of information.
Our new algorithm solves an optimisation problem to find a sampling distribution and estimation
matrices that minimise the sum of the loss relative to a distribution proposed by exponential weights
and the stability term in Eq. (5). In the example above the solution always results in a distribution
p with min(p1, p2) = 0. By contrast, previous algorithms for adversarial locally observable partial
monitoring games do not exhibit this behaviour [Foster and Rakhlin, 2012; Lattimore and Szepesva´ri,
2019a].
1 23 1 23
q p
Figure 2: An exploration distribution p derived from q for the game in Eq. (7). The expected loss when playing
p is smaller than playing q and simultaneously more information is gained because the third action is revealing.
Optimisation problem Suppose that exponential weights proposes a distribution q ∈ P . Our algo-
rithm solves an optimisation problem to find an exploration distribution and estimation matrices that
determine the loss estimators. For q ∈ P and η > 0 let optq(η) be the value of the following convex
optimisation problem:
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minimise
(Ga)ka=1,c∈Rd,p∈P
max
x∈[d]
[
1
η
(p− q)>Lex + 1
η2
k∑
a=1
paΨq
(
ηGaSaex
pa
)]
subject to
k∑
a=1
GaSa = L − [c11, . . . , cd1] .
(9)
Lemma 4 implies feasibility for non-degenerate globally observable games. We assume that Eq. (9)
can be solved exactly to obtain minimising values for (Ga)ka=1 and p ∈ P . Our algorithm, however,
is robust to small perturbations of these quantities. Let
opt∗(η) = sup
q∈P
optq(η) .
Note that both optq(η) and opt
∗(η) depend on G; this dependence is not shown to minimize clutter.
At least for reasonably sized problems, the optimisation problem can be solved using off-the-shelf
solvers and disciplined convex programming. The algorithm is a simple combination of exponential
weights using the exploration distribution and estimation matrices provided by solving Eq. (9).
input: η
for t = 1, . . . , n:
Compute Qta =
exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 yˆsa)∑k
b=1 exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 yˆsb)
Solve (9) with q = Qt to find Pt ∈ P and (Gta)ka=1
Sample At ∼ Pt and observe σt
Compute yˆt =
GtAteσt
PtAt
Algorithm 1: Exponential weights for partial monitoring
The regret of Algorithm 1 depends on the learning rate and the value of the optimisation problem,
which depends on the structure of the game. Bounds on opt∗(η) are provided subsequently.
Theorem 5. For any η > 0, the regret of Algorithm 1 is bounded by Rn ≤ log(k)
η
+ ηn opt∗(η).
Proof. Let a∗ = arg mina∈[k]
∑n
t=1 L(a, xt) be the optimal action in hindsight. Then
Rn = E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
Pta(Laxt − La∗xt)
]
= E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
Qta(Laxt − La∗xt)
]
+ E
[
n∑
t=1
(Pt −Qt)>Lext
]
. (10)
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Eq. (3) and the constraint in Eq. (9) shows that E[yˆta− yˆta∗ |A1, σ1, . . . , At−1, σt−1] = Laxt −La∗xt .
Then
E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
Qta(Laxt − La∗xt)
]
= E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
Qta(yˆta − yˆta∗)
]
≤ log(k)
η
+
1
η
E
[
n∑
t=1
ΨQt(ηyˆt)
]
(11)
=
log(k)
η
+
1
η
E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
PtaΨQt
(
ηGtaSaext
Pta
)]
,
where Eq. (11) follows from Eq. (5) and the definitions of Qt and yˆt. Combining with Eq. (10) and
the definition of opt∗(η),
Rn ≤ log(k)
η
+
1
η
E
[
n∑
t=1
(
η(Pt −Qt)>Lext +
k∑
a=1
PtaΨQt
(
ηGtaSaext
Pta
))]
≤ log(k)
η
+ ηn opt∗(η) .
Applications Table 2 provides bounds on opt∗(η) for different games and the regret bound that
results from optimising the learning rate. The proofs are provided in Sections 5 and 6. Except for
locally observable games, they mirror existing proofs bounding the stability of exponential weights.
In this way many other results could be added to this table, including bandits with graph feedback
[Alon et al., 2015] and linear bandits with finitely many arms [Bubeck et al., 2012].
Game type opt
∗(η)
bound Conditions Ref. Regret
BANDIT k/2 Prop. 8
√
2nk log(k)
FULL INFORMATION 1/2 Prop. 9
√
2n log(k)
GLOBALLY OBSERVABLE
NON-DEGENERATE
cG/
√
η η ≤ 1/c2G Prop. 10 3(cGn/2)2/3(log(k))1/3
LOCALLY OBSERVABLE
NON-DEGENERATE
9k3(d+ 1)2 η ≤ 1/(2k2(d+ 1)) Prop. 11 6k3/2(d+ 1)√n log(k)
Table 2: Upper bounds on opt∗(η) and the regret of Algorithm 1 for different games. The constant cG is
game-dependent and can be exponentially large in d, which we believe is unavoidable.
4 Online learning rate tuning
Tuning the learning rate used by Algorithm 1 is delicate. First, it is not clear that opt∗(η) can be
computed efficiently in general. Second, the learning rate that minimises the bound in Theorem 5
may be overly conservative. Algorithm 2 mitigates these issue by using an adaptive learning rate. The
algorithm is parameterised by a constant B that determines the initialisation of the learning rate. B
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should be chosen large enough that η = 1/B satisfies the conditions for the relevant game in Table 2,
but the additional regret from choosing B too large is only additive.
input: B
for t = 1, 2, . . . ,:
Set ηt = min
{
1
B
,
√
log(k)
1 +
∑t−1
s=1 Vs
}
Compute Qta =
exp
(
−ηt
∑t−1
s=1 yˆsa
)
∑k
b=1 exp
(
−ηt
∑t−1
s=1 yˆsb
)
Solve (9) with η = ηt and q = Qt to find Vt = max{0, optQt(ηt)} and
corresponding Pt and (Gta)ka=1
Sample At ∼ Pt and observe σt
Compute yˆt =
GtAteσt
PtAt
Algorithm 2: Adaptive exponential weights for partial monitoring
We now present a general theorem that bounds the regret as a function of (Vt)t, which is computed
by the algorithm. This theorem implies that Algorithm 2 recovers all regret bounds in Table 2 up to
small constant factors and additive terms.
Theorem 6. There exists a universal constant c > 0 such that the regret of Algorithm 2 is bounded by
Rn ≤ 5E

√√√√(1 + n∑
t=1
Vt
)
log(k)
+ E [max
t∈[n]
Vt
]√
log(k) +B log(k) .
A corollary using the definition of Vt is that the regret of Algorithm 2 is bounded by
Rn = O
(√
n sup{max{0, opt∗(η)} : η ≤ 1/B} log(k) +B log(k)
)
. (12)
This bound is most useful for full information, bandit and locally observable non-degenerate games
when B can be chosen so that η1 ≤ 1/B satisfies the conditions in the second column of Table 2. As
a consequence, for games of this category Theorem 6 recovers the bounds in the last column Table 2
up to small constant factors and additive terms.
For games that are globally observable but not locally observable opt∗(η) → 0 as η → 0 and
the supremum in Eq. (12) is infinite. Soon, we will argue that the learning rate used by Algorithm 2
does not decrease too fast and that the algorithm still achieves the regret bound shown in Table 2 for
globally observable games.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 6. We explain only the differences relative to the proof of Theorem 5. Recall
that Vt = max{0, optQt(ηt)}. Note, the learning rate ηt is non-increasing. Hence, by Eq. (5),
Rn ≤ E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
Qta(yˆta − yˆta∗) +
n∑
t=1
(Pt −Qt)>Lext
]
≤ E
[
log(k)
ηn
+
n∑
t=1
ΨQt(ηtyˆt)
ηt
+
n∑
t=1
(Pt −Qt)>Lext
]
(13)
≤ E
[
log(k)
ηn
+
n∑
t=1
ηtVt
]
, (14)
where Eq. (14) follows from the same argument as the proof of Theorem 5 and the definition of Vt.
The second term is bounded using Lemma 14 in the appendix by
n∑
t=1
ηtVt ≤ 4
√√√√(1 + 1
2
n∑
t=1
Vt
)
log(k) + max
t∈[k]
Vt
√
log(k) .
The definition of (ηt)nt=1 means that
log(k)
ηn
≤ B log(k) +
√√√√(1 + n∑
t=1
Vt
)
log(k) .
The bound follows by combining the parts and naive algebra.
As promised, we now show that for sufficiently large B the algorithm achieves the best known
regret for any globally observable, non-degenerate game.
Proposition 7. Fix a globally observable non-degenerate game G. Suppose that α > 0 and opt∗(η) ≤
α/
√
η for all η ≤ 1/B. Then, the regret of Algorithm 2 on G is at most
Rn = O
(
(nα)2/3(log(k))1/3 +B log(k)
)
,
where the Big-Oh hides only universal constants.
Note that the conditions of this result will be satisfied with α = cG onceB ≥ c2G with (cf. Table 2).
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 6 and an almost sure bound on
∑n
t=1 Vt. Clearly, ηt ≤ 1/B
and so by assumption Vt = max{0, optQt(ηt)} ≤ α/
√
ηt. Then, using the definition of (ηt)nt=1,
log(k)
η2t+1
≤ log(k)
η2t
+
α
η
1/2
t
=
log(k)
η2t
+
α
log(k)1/4
(
log(k)
η2t
) 1
4
.
Hence, using the definition of ηn and Lemma 15 in the appendix,
1 +
n∑
t=1
Vt ≤ log(k)
η2n
≤
(
3α(n− 1)
4 log(k)1/4
+ max{1, B2 log(k)}3/4
)4/3
.
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Substituting the above bound into the dominant term of Theorem 6 shows that√√√√(1 + n∑
t=1
Vt
)
log(k) = O
(
(knα)2/3(log(k))1/3 +B log(k)
)
.
The result is completed by noting that maxt∈[n] Vt ≤ αη−1/2n is lower-order.
5 Bandit, full information and globally observable games
We now bound opt∗(η) for bandit, full information and globally observation games. All results fol-
low from the usual arguments for bounding the stability term in the regret guarantee for exponential
weights in Eq. (5).
Proposition 8. For bandit games, opt∗(η) ≤ k/2 for all η > 0.
Proof. For bandit games the constraints of Eq. (9) are satisfied by p = q and non-negative (Ga)ka=1,
which may be chosen so that GaSaex = Laxea. This corresponds to the usual importance-weighted
estimators used for k-armed bandits. Then
optq(η) ≤ max
x∈[d]
1
η2
k∑
a=1
paΨq
(
ηGaSaex
pa
)
= max
x∈[d]
1
η2
k∑
a=1
paΨq
(
ηLaxea
pa
)
≤ 1
2
max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
L2ax ≤
k
2
,
where in the second last inequality we used Eq. (6) and the fact that pa = qa.
Proposition 9. For full information games, opt∗(η) ≤ 1/2 for all η > 0.
Proof. For these games we again let p = q and (Ga)ka=1 can be chosen so that GaSa = paL, which
satisfies the constraints. The argument then follows along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 8.
Proposition 10. For non-degenerate globally observable games there exists a constant cG depending
only on Φ and L such that for all η ≤ 1/c2G ,
opt∗(η) ≤ cG√
η
.
Proof. By the definition of a globally observable game there exist matrices (Ga)ka=1 satisfying the
constraints in Eq. (9). Let β = maxa ‖Ga‖∞ and cG = max{1, 2kβ}. Then let γ = kβ
√
η and
p = (1−γ)q+γ1/k, which is a probability distribution since γ ∈ [0, 1] for η ≤ 1/c2G . We now claim
that η〈eb, GaSaex〉/pa ≥ −1, which follows from the definitions of γ and β so that
pa ≥ γ
k
= β
√
η ≥ βη ≥ ηmax(−GaSa) ,
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where the second inequality uses the fact that cG ≥ 1 and η ≤ 1/c2G ≤ 1. To bound the objective
notice that for any x ∈ [d] it holds that
1
η
(p− q)>Lex = γ
η
(1/k − q)>Lex ≤ γ
η
=
kβ√
η
.
For the second term in the objective, by Eq. (6),
1
η2
max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
paΨq
(
ηGaSaex
pa
)
≤ max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
pa
≤ k
γ
max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=1
qb〈eb, GaSaex〉2
≤ k
2β2
γ
=
kβ√
η
.
The result follows by combining the previous two displays and the definition of cG .
6 Locally observable games
Controlling opt∗(η) for locally observable games is more involved. The main result of this section is
a proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 11. For locally observable non-degenerate games and η ≤ 1/(2k2(d+ 1)),
opt∗(η) ≤ 9k3(d+ 1)2 .
We make use of the water transfer operator, which is a construction from our earlier paper that
provides an exploration distribution suitable for locally observable games in the Bayesian setting. The
challenge in partial monitoring is that the observability structure only allows for pairwise comparison
between neighbours. This is problematic when two non-neighbouring actions are played with high
probability and the actions separating them are played with low probability. Given a distributions
q ∈ P and ν ∈ D, the water transfer operator ‘flows’ probability in q towards the greedy action a for
which ν ∈ Ca (Fig. 3). Then all loss differences can be estimated relative to the greedy action. This
decreases the variance of estimation without increasing the expected loss when the adversary samples
its action from ν. Shortly we use a minimax theorem to transfer a statement that for all ν there exists
an operator with the desired to properties to show there exists an operator such that for all ν the desired
properties hold.
Lemma 12 (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri 2019b). Suppose that G is non-degenerate and locally observ-
able and ν ∈ D. Then there exists a function Wν : P → P such that the following hold for all
q ∈ P:
(a) The expected loss does not increase: (Wν(q)− q)> Lν ≤ 0.
(b) Action probabilities are not too small: Wν(q)a ≥ qa/k for all a ∈ [k].
(c) Probabilities increase towards the root of some in-tree: there exists an in-tree T ⊆ E over [k]
such that Wν(q)a ≤Wν(q)b for all (a, b) ∈ T .
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WFigure 3: The water transfer operator. Imagine the mugs are on a flat table and arrows are one-way pipes
connecting the mugs. Water flows from mugs with more water than their neighbours in a carefully specified
way until stabilisation. Full details may be found in our previous paper [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019b].
The core result for proving Proposition 11 is the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Consider a locally observable, non-degenerate game. For all q ∈ P there exists a p ∈ P
and (Ga)ka=1 with Ga ∈ Rk×|Σ| such that
(a) Losses can be estimated up to additive constants: there exists a vector c ∈ [0, 1]d such that∑k
a=1GaSa = L − [c11, . . . , cd1].
(b) The expected loss does not increase: (p− q)>L ≤ 0.
(c) The variance is controlled: max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
pa
≤ 4k3(d+ 1)2.
(d) The range is controlled: maxa∈[k] ‖GaSa‖∞ ≤ k(d+ 1).
Proof. Define a convex set of tuples of matrices
H =
{
(Ga)
k
a=1 : Ga ∈ [−k(d+ 1), k(d+ 1)]k×|Σ|
}
,
where the linear structure onH is defined in the obvious way by identifyingH with a subset of Rk2|Σ|.
Let
C(1) =
{
(p,G) ∈ P ×H : exists c ∈ [0, 1]d such that
k∑
a=1
GaSa = L − [c11, . . . , cd1]
}
,
C(2)q =
{
(p,G) ∈ P ×H : max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
pa
≤ 4k3(d+ 1)2
}
.
Both sets C(1) and C(2) are convex. Define Cq = C(1) ∩ C(2)q and Jq : Cq ×D → R by Jq((p,G), ν) =
(p− q)>Lν. We now prove that
max
ν∈D
min
(p,G)∈Cq
Jq((p,G), ν) ≤ 0 , (15)
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where the existence of the max and min are justified by the compactness of D and Cq. The lemma
will follow from Eq. (15) and Sion’s minimax theorem to exchange the max and min. Fix ν ∈ D and
let p = Wν(q). Let T ⊆ E be the in-tree provided by Lemma 12 and for any edge e let (wea)ka=1
be a tuple of vectors satisfying Eq. (2) and with ‖wea‖∞ ≤ d + 1 for all edges e and actions a,
which is possible by [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019a, Lemma 16]. Next, for each action a define
Ga ∈ Rk×|Σ| element-wise by
(Ga)bσ =
∑
e∈pathT (b)
(wea)σ .
That (Ga)ka=1 ∈ H follows from the bound ‖wea‖∞ ≤ d + 1 and the fact that paths have length at
most k. We now show that (p,G) ∈ Cq. By the proof of Lemma 4,
k∑
a=1
GaSa = L − [LrootT 11, . . . ,LrootT d1] .
Then using Parts (b) and (c) of Lemma 12,
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
pa
=
k∑
b=1
k∑
a=1
qb
pa
 ∑
e∈pathT (b)
(wea)Φax
2
≤
k∑
b=1
(d+ 1)2
k∑
a=1
qb
pa
 ∑
e∈pathT (b)
1(a ∈ e)
2
≤ 4k3(d+ 1)2 ,
where we used Part (b) of Lemma 12 to show that qb ≤ kpb and Part (c) to show that pa ≥ pb for
a ∈ pathT (b). Thus (p,G) ∈ Cq. Finally, by Part (a) of Lemma 12, Jq((p,G), ν) = (p− q)>Lν ≤ 0,
which means that for all ν ∈ D there exists a (p,G) ∈ Cq with
Jq((p,G), ν) ≤ 0 ,
which proves Eq. (15). Clearly Jq is linear and continuous in both arguments and D is compact.
Hence, by Sion’s minimax theorem [Sion, 1958],
min
(p,G)∈Cq
max
ν∈D
Jq((p,G), ν) = max
ν∈D
min
(p,G)∈Cq
Jq((p,G), ν) . (16)
By substituting Eq. (15) into the above display it follows that there exists a (p,G) ∈ Cq such that
Jq((p,G), ν) ≤ 0 for all ν ∈ D, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. By Lemma 13, for any q ∈ P there exists an r ∈ P and c ∈ [0, 1]d and
(Ga)
k
a=1 satisfying conditions (a–d) in Lemma 13. Let p = (1 − γ)r + γ1/k with γ = ηk2(d +
1) ≤ 1/2. The constraint in Eq. (9) only depends on (Ga)ka=1 and c and is satisfied without further
calculation. Using Part (d) of Lemma 13:
pa ≥ γ
k
= ηk(d+ 1) ≥ ηmax(−GaSa) ,
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which shows that for all b ∈ [k] and x ∈ [d],
ηe>b GaSaex
pa
≥ −1 . (17)
We now control each term in the objective:
1
η2
max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
paΨq
(
ηGaSaex
pa
)
≤ max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
pa
≤ max
x∈[d]
k∑
a=1
‖GaSaex‖2diag(q)
(1− γ)ra
≤ 4k
3(d+ 1)2
1− γ ≤ 8k
3(d+ 1)2 ,
where in the first inequality we used Eq. (6) with Eq. (17), in the second inequality we used Part (c)
of Lemma 13 and in the third that γ ≤ 1/2. The other term in the objective is bounded by
(p− q)>Lex
η
=
((1− γ)r + γ1/k − q)>Lex
η
≤ γ(1/k − q)
>Lex
η
≤ γ
η
≤ k3(d+ 1)2 .
Hence, opt∗(η) ≤ 9k3(d+ 1)2.
7 Discussion
We introduced a new algorithm for finite partial monitoring that is efficient, nearly parameter free
and enjoys roughly the best known regret in all classes of games. Notably, this is the first efficient
algorithm for which the regret is independent of arbitrarily large game-dependent constants for locally
observable non-degenerate games. A natural criticism of previous algorithms for partial monitoring is
that the algorithms are generally quite conservative and not practical for normal problems. As far as we
can tell, the proposed algorithm does not suffer from this problem, at least recovering standard bounds
in bandit and full information settings. In certain cases the algorithm may also adapt to the choices of
the adversary. The principle for finding an exploration distribution and estimation procedure is generic
and may work well in other problems.
Lower bounds The best known lower bound for locally observable partial monitoring games is ei-
ther Ω(
√
kn) or Ω(d
√
n), which are witnessed by a standard Bernoulli bandit [Auer et al., 1995] and a
result by the authors [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019a]. If pressed, we would speculate that Θ(kd
√
n)
is the correct worst-case regret over all d-outcome k-action non-degenerate locally observable partial
monitoring games.
Infinite outcome spaces Finiteness of the outcome space was not used in the proofs of Theorem 5
or Theorem 6 and in particular the results in Table 2 continue to hold in this case (the result for locally
observable games becomes vacuous). The main cost of infinite outcome spaces is that the optimisation
problem Eq. (9) is unlikely to be tractable without additional structure. Classic examples of infinite
games for which the regret can be well controlled are bandit and full information games. In both
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games the outcomes (xt)nt=1 are chosen in X = [0, 1]k and L(a, x) = xa (using the notation of
Remark 1). The signal function is Φ(a, x) = xa for bandits and Φ(a, x) = x for the full information
games. Exploring the existence of a simple classification theorem for infinite-outcome games is an
interesting future direction. Understanding when Eq. (9) is tractable is also intriguing.
Game-dependent bounds One of the objectives of this work was to design an efficient algorithm
for which the regret does not depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants. Naturally it is de-
sirable to have small game-dependent constants and adaptivity to the choices of the adversary. Table 2
provides upper bounds on opt∗(η) for various classes, but the actual values depends on the game.
Understanding the dependence of this optimisation problem on the structure of the loss and signal
matrices is an interesting open direction. Also interesting is whether or not opt∗(η) is a fundamental
quantity for the difficulty of the game and/or the regret of our algorithms.
Adaptivity Algorithm 2 already exhibits some adaptivity in the lucky situation that Vt is small. This
is not entirely satisfactory, however, since Vt is a random variable that depends on the choices of
both the learner and the adversary. We anticipate that all the usual enhancements for adaptivity – log
barrier, biased estimates and optimism – can be applied here [Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013; Bubeck
et al., 2018; Wei and Luo, 2018; Bubeck et al., 2019, for example]. A related challenge would be to
seek a best-of-both-worlds result using the INF potential [Zimmert et al., 2019].
Beyond exponential weights The objective in Eq. (9) is chosen so that the terms in Eq. (11) are
well controlled, which corresponds to bounding the stability term in the regret analysis of exponential
weights. Other algorithms can be obtained by replacing exponential weights with follow the regu-
larized leader and Legendre potential F . A standard regret bound (holding under certain technical
conditions) is
Rn ≤ diamF (P)
η
+
1
η
E
[
n∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
PtaDF ∗
(
∇F (Qt)− ηGtaSaext
Pta
,∇F (Qt)
)]
(18)
+ E
[
n∑
t=1
(Qt − Pt)>Lext
]
.
where diamF (P) = maxx,y∈P F (x)−F (y) is the diameter andDF ∗(x, y) is the Bregman divergence
between x and y with respect to the Fenchel conjugate of F . Let
Ψq(z) = DF ∗(∇F (q)− z,∇F (q)) .
Then convexity of F ∗ implies that the perspective (p, z) 7→ pΨq(z/p) is also convex for p > 0.
When F is the unnormalised negentropy, the definition above reduces to Eq. (4). All this means that
the same approach holds more broadly for other potentials, which carry certain advantages in some
settings [Audibert and Bubeck, 2009; Bubeck et al., 2018; Wei and Luo, 2018; Bubeck et al., 2019,
and others]. For more details on follow the regularised leader and bounds of the form in Eq. (18), see
[Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019, Chapter 28] and [Hazan, 2016]. We leave a deeper exploration of
these ideas for the future.
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Degenerate games The non-degeneracy assumption is for simplicity only: for degenerate games the
only change is that the exponential weights distribution should be computed over the Pareto optimal
actions (dim(Ca) = d−1) while the optimisation problem that determines the exploration distribution
must include all actions. As in our previous work, even for locally observable games the constants can
be exponential in d, which we believe is unavoidable [Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019b].
Connections between stability and the information ratio Zimmert and Lattimore [2019] have
shown that the generalised information ratio can be bounded by a worst-case bound on the stability
term of mirror descent, which makes a connection between the information-theoretic tools and those
from online convex optimisation. Here we work in the other direction, using duality and the techniques
for bounding the information ratio to bound the stability term. The argument does not provide an
equivalence between stability and the information ratio, but perhaps reinforces the feeling that there is
an interesting connection here.
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A Technical lemmas
Lemma 14 (Pogodin and Lattimore 2019). Let (at)nt=1 be a sequence of non-negative reals. Then
n∑
t=1
at√
1 +
∑t−1
s=1 as
≤ 4
√√√√1 + 1
2
n∑
t=1
at + max
t∈[n]
at .
Lemma 15. Let α > 0 and (at)nt=1 be a sequence of non-negative reals with at+1 ≤ at+αa1/4t . Then
an ≤
(
3α(n− 1)
4
+ a
3/4
1
)4/3
.
Proof. Consider the differential equation y(0) = a1 and y′(t) = αy(t)1/4, which has solution
y(t) =
(
3αt
4
+ a
3/4
1
)4/3
.
By comparison, an ≤ y(n− 1) and the result follows.
19
